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Abstract 
Strategy tools are a common element of tourism and hotel management courses, journal 
articles and textbooks. In this paper we explore why practitioners do not find tools useful and 
hence reject their use as a strategy practice. Drawing on a cross-case analysis of qualitative 
data from three hotel companies, key findings suggest that strategy tools may restrict the 
deployment of experience-based knowledge, strategy practices are legitimised by top 
managers’ perceptions and the lack of strategizing activities inhibits the potential for tool use. 
The industry context, including the unique ownership-management structure and 
institutionalised practices, also significantly influences the use and perceived value of tools. 
Practitioners are recommended to reconsider the ability of strategy tools to facilitate debate 
and act as boundary spanning objects and tourism researchers are encouraged to further study 
how practitioners use and value tools in order to create new ones based on practice rather than 
only on theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Strategy tools such as SWOT analysis, Porter’s Five Forces framework and the Value Chain, 
are popular staples in business and tourism schools (Kachra & Schnietz, 2008) and strategy 
practitioners often acknowledge using them in their strategy work (Jarzabkowski, Giulietti, 
Oliveira, & Amoo, 2013; Knott, 2008; Oliveira, Rosa, & Antonio, 2008). Studies have 
established which specific tools are supposedly used (e.g., Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003) and the 
changing popularity of different tools (e.g., Pascale, 1990; Rigby, 2001; Rigby & Bilodeau, 
2005; 2011). There is, however, a continued lack of understanding about how and why 
managers actually use and don’t use these “knowledge artefacts” generally learned during 
their management education (Hodgkinson, Whittington, Johnson, & Schwarz, 2006; 
Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007; Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Jarzabkowski & Spee, 
2009; Wright, Paroutis, & Blettner, 2013). Such knowledge is critical since the concepts that 
shape an organisation’s strategy discourse help legitimise certain strategies and influence how 
decisions are made and resources allocated (Whittington et al., 2003).  
 
This lacuna appears to exist because most academics “seem wedded to a representational 
epistemology, conceptualising use as primarily a prescriptive application” (Jarzabkowski & 
Wilson, 2006, p.362). In response, this study examines tool use from what Jarzabkowski and 
Kaplan (2015) term “the realism of experience” (p.1) by investigating how managers actually 
use and do not use tools in their strategy-making. It therefore falls exactly into the strategy-as-
practice (SAP) research agenda (Vaaraa & Whittington, 2012). This practice perspective sees 
strategy as a type of work people do rather than only as something organisations have 
(Jarzabkowski, 2005). Being more concerned with a post-rational exploration (Ezzamel & 
Willmott, 2004) of the skills, techniques and tools that are used when creating strategy 
(Johnson, Melin, & Whittington, 2003) SAP provides a micro-level perspective of the actual 
practice and practices of strategy practitioners. SAP is particularly concerned with the 
contextualisation of these micro-activities (Belmondo & Sargis-Roussel, 2015) since 
practitioners do not act “in isolation but are instead constantly drawing upon the regular, 
socially defined modes of acting that arise from the plural social institutions to which they 
belong” (Balogun, Jarzabkowski, & Seidl, 2007, p.199). This study thus examines the 
contextual influences on practitioners’ actual use and rejection of strategy tools.  
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Both practitioners and academics need better knowledge about the relevance and role of 
strategy tools within specific contexts (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006; Johnson et al., 2003). 
Such knowledge can improve managerial effectiveness by helping practitioners to better 
reflect on their specific strategy work processes and practices (Johnson et al., 2003). Studying 
why and how formal strategy tools are and are not used in the strategic management process 
can also help reveal what “is involved in being a competent strategist and how some 
practitioners are more influential than others” (Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008, p.283). An 
understanding of practitioners’ experiences with tools can assist researchers and educators in 
updating their own research and pedagogical practices and to design better tools 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2013). For example, by determining how and why 
practitioners do not use these tools, academics can better recognize and address the limitations 
of tools not only with regards to their rational and analytical purposes, but also their practical 
implementation, thereby also addressing Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011) recent call for a better 
understanding of practical (as opposed to scientific) rationality. 
 
This paper seeks to contribute in a number of overarching ways to the applied SAP field. By 
examining why practitioners do not use strategy tools as part of their strategy-making 
activities, it responds to the call for studies about the usefulness of strategy tools in 
organisational settings and between different groups of managers (Wright et al., 2013). As it 
studies how and why strategists do not use tools, it heeds Carter, Clegg, and Kornberger’s 
(2008) warning that “by only focusing on what strategists do, SAP scholars could mistakenly 
neglect what is not done or practised and thus potentially miss some of the ‘strategic spaces’ 
in which strategy is constituted” (p.9). By drawing on empirical data about strategy making 
from companies in the single industrial setting of the international hotel industry, it provides 
an in-depth analysis of how a contextual setting shapes practitioners’ non-use of tools. The 
focus on the hotel industry is especially relevant since it is an industry which has, with mixed 
results, habitually incorporated findings and recommendations, including tools and concepts, 
from the broader general business environment (Okumus & Wong, 2005; Olsen & Roper, 
1998). By studying strategists from an industry allied to tourism, we are also able to add to the 
nascent work of scholars investigating strategy at work within tourism organisations (see for 
example, Aldehayyat, 2011; Beritelli & Laesser, 2011; Devine & Devine, 2011; Hodari & 
Sturman, 2014; Stokes, 2008).  
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The paper firstly reviews previous research into strategy tool use and non-use. It then outlines 
the research design of the multiple case study approach employed. The findings from three 
firms, including interviews with 52 executives and managers, observations and document 
analysis, are then evaluated in light of previous research. The conclusion outlines the main 
contributions of the study and its limitations and forwards implications for practitioners, 
researchers and hotel and tourism management educators.  
 
2. Tools and their use 
Strategy tools can be physical, processual or conceptual, and previous studies have examined 
practitioners’ use of, for example, documents (Vaara, Sorsa, & Pälli, 2010), PowerPoint 
(Kaplan, 2011), and analytical models and frameworks (Stenfors, 2007). The present study’s 
fundamental interest lies with the use of popular academic and consultancy tools, and 
therefore focuses on the conceptual and analytical frameworks, matrices and models that are 
intended to help managers simplify and represent complex situations as part of the strategy 
formulation process. For the purposes of this paper we focus on tools such as Porter’s Five 
Forces (Porter, 1980), SWOT analysis (Learned, Christensen, & Andrews, 1961), the Value 
Chain (Porter, 1985) and the BCG matrix (Henderson, 1979) which codify knowledge within 
structured approaches to strategic analyses, often through some form of visual depiction or 
propositional framework (Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2015; March, 2006; Paroutis, Franco, & 
Papadopoulos, 2015). 
 
2.1 The use and usefulness of tools 
The common consensus within the literature is that most strategy concepts and tools are 
developed to help managers deal with the uncertainties they face when analysing and 
evaluating strategic choices (Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2015). Strategy tools, such as 
frameworks and matrices, have long been noted for their inherent aim to help sort and 
structure information and thoughts related to strategic issues, and as such to help practitioners 
simplify, synthesise and diagnose large amounts of information (Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 
1983; Morecroft, 1992). March (2006) refers to strategy tools as “technologies of rationality” 
(p.211) since they offer models of causal structures, provide spaces for collecting data, and 
establish decision rules for selecting among alternatives. Previous studies have, 
understandably, tended to ask managers about their use of tools in an almost single-
dimensional way, perceiving them as merely analytical artefacts. From a practice perspective 
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of strategy, however, it is clear that they play other roles which can only be uncovered if the 
tools are studied in their situated usage. For example, in reality tools might not be used ‘by-
the-book’ (Whittington, 2010) and may be changed by the practitioner (Belmondo & Sargis-
Roussel, 2015; Jarzabkowski, 2005). Conceptualising strategy tools as socially and 
contextually embedded therefore provides greater insight into their actual use and role in 
strategy making.  
 
The classical view of strategy advocates that strategy making is still the preserve of top 
managers (the traditional ‘strategists’). There is, however, much evidence to suggest that this 
view may no longer be appropriate since, for example, middle managers are often the 
interpreters and sellers (Rouleau, 2005), ‘sensemakers’ (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 2005) and 
drivers (Mantere, 2008; Wooldridge, Schmid, & Floyd, 2008) of organisational strategy and 
change. Middle managers may thus go beyond their operational responsibilities and influence 
strategic activities as well as champion strategic ideas. Regnér (2003) found a more inclusive 
approach to strategy making in his observations within four Swedish multinationals. In these 
organisations, strategy ideas were deeply rooted in two diverse managerial contexts and 
locations – the centre and periphery – where top management and strategic planning staff as 
well as middle and lower level managers were all involved in strategy creation.  
 
Strategy tools, irrelevant as to who is using them, can act as boundary-spanning objects 
(Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009) since they can help mitigate the communication problems that 
result from the effects of geographic and hierarchal decentralisation and divisionalization. For 
example, they may help provide a common interface and language between diverse groups 
and individual actors, and therefore mediate strategizing activities across organisational levels 
(Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009; Stenfors, Tanner, & Haapalinna, 2004). In this sense, strategy 
tools can be perceived as a type of ‘processual toy’ (Eden, 1992) which group members can 
use together interactively to facilitate their understanding and use of new meanings. Stenfors 
et al. (2004) similarly found through their study that the most commonly cited benefits of 
tools were related to the social world, including improved work processes and 
communication. The use of tools during meetings and workshops was seen as particularly 
beneficial since they were said to help open up discussions and raise different insights. 
Strategy tools can therefore help establish a shared context (Osterlund & Carlile, 2005) in 
which dissimilar strategists at different organisational levels can more successfully 
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collaborate. However, their capacity is not only practical but also political. As boundary-
spanning objects they may assist actors in gaining support for particular views (Jarzabkowski 
& Spee, 2009) and may help resolve relational and political differences (Bourgeois & 
Eisenhardt, 1988). 
 
While some well-known techniques and tools may be used because they are valuable for 
analysing different situations and for communicating coherent decisions (Cummings & 
Angwin, 2004), social pressures to conform (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)  may also be a 
key reason why certain tools continue in popularity. For example, since pre-existing concepts 
already come with reasons as to why they should be used, it may be easier for the practitioner 
to justify their sustained use (Seidl, 2007). Replicating the choices of other successful 
organisations may also be seen as less risky during turbulent times (Thompson, 1967). 
Similarly, firms facing intense competition may copy an existing tool or activity if doing so 
helps to minimise the benefits it provides the competition (O'Neill, Pouder, & Buchholtz, 
1998). In addition, the use of tools in strategy making may signify the user as a strategist 
(Mantere & Vaara, 2008) and convey an appearance of rationality. Strategy tools therefore 
may be more than just ‘technologies of rationality’ (March, 2006) and may instead function as 
technologies of ‘intended rationality’ (Dodgson, Gann, & Phillips, 2013).  
 
Many of the tools practitioners use may in fact be adopted as a result of organisational or 
industry norms and standards. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), many ideas and 
practices become the standard within a field due to political influences (i.e., coercive 
isomorphism) and professionalization (i.e., normative isomorphism). They suggest that 
organisations tend to model themselves according to the practices of other organisations in 
their field which they consider to be more successful or legitimate. Similarly, practitioners 
help to establish the perceived acceptability and usefulness of certain practices as they 
endeavour to define their appropriate work methods and ‘to establish a cognitive base and 
legitimization for their occupational autonomy’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 152). Practices 
that are institutionalised therefore include those which firms are unlikely to abandon since 
they are integrally important to the firm’s values and cognitive structure (Carson, Lanier, 
Carson, & Guidry, 2000).  
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2.2 The rejection of tools 
There are numerous reasons why strategy practitioners may reject existing strategy tools. A 
commonly suggested explanation is that academic research and its associated knowledge 
artefacts (Bartunek, Rynes, & Ireland, 2006; Shrivastava, 1987; Van de Ven, 1992; Walsh, 
Tushman, Kimberly, Starbuck, & Ashford, 2007) are out of kilter with those actually doing 
strategy, in other words, academia is said to value rigour whilst management prioritizes 
relevance (Bennis & O'Toole, 2005; Hambrick, 2004; Marcus, Goodman, & Grazman, 1995; 
Mintzberg, 2004). Bettis (1991) for example, suggests that a “normal science straitjacket” (p. 
315) is the key reason that strategy research has limited influence on management practices. 
March (2006) similarly argues that technologies of rationality, such as the prescribed use of 
tools, may satisfy our “academic obligations to defend a utopia of the mind against the 
realism of experience” (p.211). 
 
Another reason for rejection lies in the frustration of using tools. Rigby’s (2001; 2003; Rigby 
& Bilodeau, 2005; 2011; 2013) studies of the popularity of general management tools suggest 
that although practitioners think that by using the ‘right tools’ their companies are more likely 
to succeed, over 80 percent of executives surveyed believed that most management tools do 
not deliver what they promise. He interprets this to mean that while companies do use a lot of 
tools, their experience with them has been unsatisfying and unsuccessful. More recently, 
Wright et al. (2013) found that tools were not considered useful by their graduate students 
when they were difficult to use and/or did not provide sufficient guidance on decisions. The 
researchers also noticed that when actors were frustrated with “bad tools,” the strategic 
analyses being undertaken were less effective.  
 
Academics have long noted that strategy tools may also be rejected because of their own 
inherent shortcomings and inability to aid practitioners. Varadarajan (1999), for example, 
recommended that many analytical frameworks, tools and techniques should be discarded by 
practitioners and academics as they are outdated. Sheth and Sisodia (1999) noted that in such 
cases these tools serve “more to impede and inhibit us than to illuminate reality in a 
meaningful and useful way” (p.72). They suggested that such tools also act as blinders that 
prevent practitioners from seeing the bigger picture. Hill and Westbrook (1997) argued that 
ideas and tools that were once valuable may continue to influence the field long past their 
time of usefulness and thus “hold an unmerited position in the thinking used in education, 
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management development, consultancy, and in the real work of managing businesses” (p.52). 
They go on to say that the use of such tools not only produces negative results, but their use 
may also inhibit practitioners from adopting newer and better tools and techniques. In using 
frameworks practitioners can themselves become ‘framed’ (Dunbar, Garud, & Raghuram, 
1996; Worren, Moore, & Elliott, 2002) as they become too familiar and comfortable with 
certain ways of assessing situations and therefore fail to consider alternative ways of doing so. 
Such framing processes may make managers more confident in their decisions, which can in 
turn make action easier, however these tools may not lead to the best actions or decisions 
since they tend to repeatedly result in the same beliefs and actions. Such over-usage and 
institutionalised use (Priem & Rosenstein, 2000) implies that tools can become restrictive 
paradigms and thus limit creative and innovative thinking and action (Thomas, 1984), thereby 
reducing a firm’s ability to remain competitive and successful.  
 
Researchers have found that the popularity of strategy tools is not consistent across different 
industries (Aldehayyat & Anchor, 2008; Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003; Rigby, 2003; Rigby & 
Bilodeau, 2005; Stenfors et al., 2004). Certain tools may have limited utility due to the fact 
that they were usually developed in order to answer very particular questions or to analyse 
very specific situations (Furrer & Thomas, 2000) or industrial contexts (Narayanan & Fahey, 
2005). Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2006) note, for example, that dissatisfaction with certain 
tools could arise because a practitioner’s organisation may compete within different 
environmental conditions than those for which the concept was originally intended. Concerns 
have also been raised about whether strategy tools might be obsolete under changing industry 
conditions (D'Aveni & Gunther, 1995). There is a further danger that in periods of great 
uncertainty, decision-making ‘disasters’ may stem from oversimplification or 
misrepresentation encoded in tools (March, 2006).  Stenfors and Tanner (2006) note, as well, 
that evaluating the usefulness of a tool is not possible through traditional evaluation means 
since most strategic situations are unique, and because “the context in which the tool is used 
becomes of great importance and cannot be separated from the tool in the process of 
evaluation” (p.22). It is this belief, that industry contexts are important variables affecting 
strategy tools and their usefulness (Whittington, 2006), which duly influenced this study.  
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3. Research design  
Most studies that have explicitly studied strategy tools have been conducted to identify which 
and when tools are used rather than how or why they are or are not used (Frost, 2003; 
Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Knott, 2008). Findings have usually been gathered through the use 
of list-based surveys even though such a method may not correctly identify which tools 
managers are actually using. For example, based on the 10 interviews conducted with top 
managers, Knott (2008) identified that (1) practitioners may not think of popular and generic 
business practices as tools, (2) that they do not consider to have used tools if it was only part 
of their initial inspiration for a project, and (3) that they cite having used a tool even when the 
use was either not formal or only used to a very limited extent. As such, he believes that 
survey-based studies are not “a measure of actual activity, but simply a gauge of what is 
fashionable talk” (p. 29). Believing, therefore, that the use of tools cannot be separated from 
the real-life context and ‘situatedness,’ an exploratory and descriptive study was undertaken 
focusing on how and why tools are used and not used. Similar to the research designs 
employed by other SAP researchers (e.g., Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003; Regnér, 2003) a 
multiple case study method using a qualitative research approach was deemed appropriate. 
Although research on the use of strategy tools sometimes draws on the views of business 
school students due to the difficulty researchers experience in gaining access to practitioners 
and their organisations (e.g., Wright et al., 2013), we believed that a richer and more accurate 
understanding of the usefulness of tools would be acquired through field work with 
practitioners during their strategy making activities.  
 
3.1 Research Sites 
We chose to investigate companies in the hotel industry, a context we knew well and where  
the increasing influence of inter alia stakeholders,  as well as consolidation and globalisation 
pressures, meant that we would find much strategizing as companies looked to jockey for the 
best competitive positions. Based on theoretical sampling procedures (Yin, 2003), multiple 
companies were selected as cases, thus responding to the SAP literature calling for studies 
across several organisations (Balogun, Huff, & Johnson, 2003; Johnson et al., 2003; 
Whittington, 2006). Three companies met case selection criteria which included being 
primarily involved in the operation of hotels and being large enough to have a structure 
comprising top and middle managers as well as corporate and hotel-level managers and staff. 
It was particularly important that tool use was evaluated across different hierarchical levels as 
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most previous studies have queried only top managers (Clark, 1997; Frost, 2003; Knott, 2008; 
Oliveira et al., 2008). Since strategy is increasingly part of middle and lower-level managers’ 
work (Wooldridge et al., 2008) including in the hotel industry (Ghorbal-Blal, 2011), this study 
responded to suggestions that strategizing activities be studied across multiple organisational 
levels within individual firms (Hambrick, 2004; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). 
 
In order to gain greater support for the research (Balogun et al., 2003), corporate executives 
were asked to assist in the identification of on-going strategic projects which would form the 
unit of analysis in which to investigate the situated use of strategy tools. Criteria were 
established for the specific project to be evaluated. First the project had to be fundamental to 
the growth of the company. Given the reliance on ‘asset-light’ means of growth amongst hotel 
companies (Slattery, Gamse, & Roper, 2008) this would likely necessitate a strategy involving 
expansion to new markets or with new products. Second, the strategic project had to be 
current in order for an ethnographic methodology to be employed so the progress of the 
project would be researched as far as possible in real-time but where, via interviews, further 
recall and interpretation of activities could be gained (Balogun et al., 2003; Samra‐Fredericks, 
2000). Third, there needed to be strong insider support (Langley, 1988) as the study required 
access to internal documents and interview respondents, as well as observation of meetings, 
all involving the development of a major strategic project which had competitive implications.  
 
Three company cases and corresponding projects were selected which met these criteria. The 
selected company cases - Alpha, Beta and Gamma - between them owned, managed and 
franchised hotels, and were based in the USA, Europe and UK respectively. Two were 
publicly listed and one was privately held. Whilst one company operated more than ten brands 
in over 60 countries, another company operated only two hotel brands in 20 countries. The 
third case operated two brands in a domestic setting. The largest firm comprises nearly 4,000 
hotels in its system, while the smallest over 20 properties.  
 
The corresponding projects investigated involved a variety of strategic initiatives. As one of 
the world’s largest hotel companies, the vast majority of properties operated by Alpha are 
located in the USA where the company was founded. Often credited with having originated 
the concept of ‘asset light,’ it now has little equity interest in its portfolio. As a senior 
manager in Industry Relations explained “Wall Street rewards us for not being in the real 
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estate business and for only focusing on running hotels.” The research focuses on Alpha’s 
decision to revise its European expansion strategy since until then it had failed to deliver 
targeted portfolio growth.  
 
Beta has a long history in Europe, having originated from a country seen as the epitome of 
hotel-keeping. Known for its luxury hotel brand, its primary business is the management of 
hotels on behalf of third party owners. The ownership of Beta has varied over the years; it was 
privatized in the 1990s and then purchased by an unrelated, foreign investment entity. The 
research centres on a major strategic initiative involving a private equity group as a joint 
venture partner entailing the establishment and operation of a new regional brand. 
 
Gamma, a UK-based hotel company, was founded in the early 1990s, sold numerous times 
over the following 10 years, and was currently owned by a UK investment firm. Most 
management team members were responsible for functional areas within both of the 
company’s brands. The company’s properties were located in the United Kingdom and except 
for a few that were held on long-term leasehold agreements all were owned and managed by 
Gamma. The research centres on the CEO’s decision to reposition one of its brands in order to 
improve performance.  
 
3.2 Data Collection 
Whilst there was no precedence for the most appropriate data collection methods for this 
study’s specific focus, the decision was made to rely on documents, interviews and 
observations since, in part, these multiple methods are often employed in other SAP studies 
examining practitioners’ strategizing practices (see Balogun et al., 2003). Due to its dominant 
position in SAP research (Hendry, Kiel, & Nicholson, 2010), a large focus was placed on the 
interview method. These research methods were deemed particularly appropriate since, as 
Johnson et al  (2007) note, when researching strategy practices it is imperative to (1) 
undertake observations to capture the in-vivo experience of doing strategy, (2) conduct 
interviews and other forms of interaction with organisation members in order to understand 
the interpretations that people place on these activities, and (3) to collect the artefacts of 
strategizing such as minutes of meetings, reports, slide presentations and objects. 
Interviews with 52 managers in the three case companies formed a critical part of the data 
collection process. Respondents were drawn from across the project teams and included the 
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Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer and Executive, Senior and Vice-Presidents 
and Directors from many different functional areas. Following Langley's (1988) advice, other 
employees and managers were tracked down when identified as appropriate and interviewed. 
These included hotel general managers, graduate trainees and personal assistants. Following 
the same semi-structured outline, respondents were interviewed ‘on-site’ (i.e., company 
headquarters and at hotel properties) and asked to discuss their strategizing activities with 
reference to the specific project being investigated. Whilst an interview outline was followed, 
and sets of similar questions were asked to all respondents, the main idea was for each to ‘tell 
a story’ about the firm’s strategy process. Specifically related to the strategic project they 
talked about the project itself and their specific role, and in more depth they discussed the 
usefulness of strategy tools in the strategy process. Formal interviews were recorded wherever 
possible and transcribed. Informal interviews were also conducted whilst on site in the firms. 
Interviews were augmented with the collection of documents such as internal memos, meeting 
minutes, company reports and presentation material. Observation also took place with the aim 
of better understanding the firms and their behavioural processes and contexts (Remenyi, 
Williams, Money, & Swartz, 1998). These observation periods (spanning three years) allowed 
actual events such as meetings and strategy presentations and workshops to be experienced in 
real time. By interspersing interviews throughout the observation period, we followed the 
suggestion of Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011) and made use of temporary breakdowns in the 
strategy process in order to allow practitioners to reflect on their work and thus reveal their 
internal logic of practice. Observations were recorded in a free-association form (Denzin, 
1989).  
3.3. Data Analysis 
The data analysis comprised four main stages. The first level involved data reduction 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Interview transcriptions, observation field notes and collected documents 
were input into the qualitative data analysis software programme NVivo. In so doing, the data 
was structured into more manageable units for analysis and thematic coding (King, 1998). 
This enabled vignettes to be developed which thickly described each company and its 
approach to strategy, thus establishing detail about the situated activity (Jarzabkowski, 2005) 
of strategy making. The second level employed within-case analysis. Tracing through all the 
data, a chronologically ordered ‘decision story’ (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988) was 
constructed depicting the different stages of the investigated projects, the main agents 
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involved and the instances and circumstances of strategy tool use (we were able to interpret 
‘templates’ and ‘frameworks’ as relabelled strategy tools). The third step was to conduct 
analyses across the three cases. Given our interest in practical rationality, we looked for 
families of resemblances (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011) in order to find similarities and 
differences in the empirical phenomenon being investigated. The last stage was an interactive 
process whereby the empirical data was evaluated against the existing literature. Using and 
adapting the conceptual categorization of key authors such as Orlikowski (2000), Burgelman 
(1983), Star and Griesemer (1989) and Carlile (2002), we were able to construct an 
integrative framework enabling the analysis of our data on strategy tool use and non-use. Key 
phrases and statements within the data were located manually thus creating themes which 
emerged from the between-case data. During the iterative process of comparing the data with 
previous literature, findings from different source data were triangulated. An attempt was 
made to balance description and interpretation, analysing the data until a point of saturation 
was reached (Eisenhardt, 1989). In line with Johnson et al.’s (2007) recommendations, 
findings in the descriptive narrative accounts of the use of strategy tools were compared with 
the ‘received view’ (p. 72), i.e., with the normative accounts promulgated in practitioner 
sources and business school teaching.  
 
4. Findings and Discussion  
Before discussing our findings in terms of the non-use and rejection of strategy tools it is 
worth reiterating that we did find managers, both in the centre and periphery of the three case 
organisations, who found strategy tools useful. Similar to the outcomes of other empirical 
enquiries, standard strategy tools were used, albeit flexibly and with some improvisation, to 
help managers deal with the uncertainties faced when making strategic decisions 
(Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2015). Although some of the tools resembled standard strategy 
analysis frameworks, they were often not represented as ‘by-the-book’ (Whittington, 2010), 
were sometimes adapted (Jarratt & Stiles, 2010; Jarzabkowski & Kaplan, 2015; Lozeau, 
Langley, & Denis, 2002) almost beyond recognition, (McCabe & Narayanan, 1991) and their 
use was often ‘veiled’. 
 
Most of the findings, however, pointed to less affirmative elements of strategy tool use which 
meant that tools were rejected as strategy making artefacts and mechanisms. These latter 
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findings are the focus of this paper and they are organised into three thematic areas: (1) the 
organisational approach to strategy formulation and strategy practices, mainly as a result of 
top management perceptions and actions, (2) the lack of tool legitimacy, and (3) contextual 
influences resulting from industry characteristics. The following discussion is structured 
around these three areas. 
 
4.1 Organisational approach to strategy formulation and strategy practices  
Top executives are often said to be the organisational members most likely to use strategy 
tools since they have more strategic responsibilities (see Hill & Westbrook, 1997; 
Hodgkinson et al., 2006). This study’s findings revealed, however, that the three firms’ CEOs 
not only refrained from using any of the conceptual strategy tools commonly identified as the 
most popular  (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013), but in addition their views about strategy, strategy 
making and strategy tools discouraged the use of such tools within their firms. As a 
respondent in Beta suggested, “[We are] the wrong company to study if you want to see how 
strategy gets made…it’s just [CEO name] and his ideas that we have to accept and 
implement.” Top strategists may often use strategy tools to help structure their thinking and 
guide the strategic decision-making process (Balogun et al., 2007). This is not, however, the 
situation in the study’s firms where the CEOs considered the idea that conceptual tools can 
aid one’s strategic thinking as “silly” (CEO, Beta) and “ridiculous” (CEO, Alpha). To them, 
tools imply rules and structure while ‘real strategic thinking’ is about breaking rules and 
avoiding such structure. 
 
According to the CEOs, strategy making should be built around insights gathered from 
personal experience. They believed that formal tools, including models and frameworks, were 
more appropriate for, and perhaps more commonly used by, ‘novices’ who lack professional 
experience and/or confidence in their know-how. Alpha’s CEO, for example, instructed his 
top executives and their teams to create solutions based on their experiences in the industry 
and at the company, and not through tools, especially as most top executives had been with 
the firm for several decades. When a more recently hired executive in the Finance department 
who had been given a “mandate to challenge conventional thinking” suggested that the firm 
change the planning process to include more formal procedures and tools, he met with the 
following reaction: 
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“The people just gagged. Gagged!  And not only that, almost said ‘What the 
hell are you thinking? We don’t do that here’.” 
 
Similarly, Gamma’s CEO distrusted ideas that came through the use of formal tools. He 
believed that they lacked the incorporation of industry experience and in-depth familiarity 
with the firm’s unique characteristics. Such views are consistent with past research which has 
found that practitioners believe that the use of tools can prevent them from deploying 
knowledge-based experience (Grant, 2003). Although practitioners often combine strategic 
concepts with the practical knowledge they have gained from previous experiences (Schön, 
1982), these CEOs saw tools as rigid instruments that do not lend themselves to personal 
experience, or alternatively, restrict one from drawing on such knowledge. Their rejection of 
tools supports previous observations that the complexity of strategic decision-making means 
that strategists may be better served through experience-based insights rather than technical 
formality and analytical detachment (Grant, 2003; Hayes & Abernathy, 1980).  
 
Valuing experience over formal analysis and tools influences the strategy creation process 
since such values affect a firm’s thinking style which can lead to organisational paradigms 
about how strategy should be made (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998). Beta and 
Gamma were repeatedly described as ‘entrepreneurial’ since their strategic management 
process and decision-making styles were predominantly based on the CEOs managing the 
process and making the majority of strategic decisions themselves. Both CEOs describe their 
strategies as being grounded in ‘vision’ and ‘intuition’ with Beta’s CEO specifically 
commenting that he considered the use of tools as a distraction that “prevents real leaders 
from engaging in real strategy work.” Both CEOs commented that using tools hindered their 
ability to have an overall vision for the company. They perceived them as too simplistic to 
encompass the whole strategic situation facing their respective firms. Such views are 
consistent with some criticisms levelled at analytical frameworks which suggest that they 
prevent top managers from seeing ‘the big picture’ since they focus on narrow topics (Sheth 
& Sisodia, 1999).  
 
Rational approaches to strategy formulation and decision-making, based in part on conceptual 
tools, was often seen as ineffective across the three firms. For example, the use of extensive 
analysis and consultancy tools was blamed for the near bankruptcy of Beta, while the current 
CEO’s vision was commonly cited as having saved the firm. Similarly, a dedicated Strategy 
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Department’s extensive environmental scanning techniques and tools did not help Alpha to 
foresee the challenges they faced in the early 1990s. The rejection of tools as analytical 
“crutches” (CEO, Beta), reflects Whittington, Molloy, Mayer & Smith’s (2006) suggestion 
that the traditional view of strategy has perhaps failed  practitioners not because of its 
deliberateness, but because of its tendency to be overly isolated and logical.   
 
That top strategists in the three organisations prioritised experience over formal analysis when 
formulating strategy was not surprising in light of the literature which suggests that hotel 
industry practitioners generally demonstrate a preference for a ‘hands on’ management style 
as opposed to more structured analysis (Okumus, 2004). For example, the three CEOs were 
much more focused on issues of immediate concern as opposed to long-term plans, and as 
such did not see the need for formal strategizing in order to create their firm’s overall 
direction. Alpha’s CEO, for instance, was described as a “highly tactical person” who 
believed that if “you take care of the short-term the long-term falls into place” and that a focus 
on immediate concerns assists colleagues to “keep their eye on the ball.” This emphasis on 
short-termism is consistent with previous research which has found it to be of greater concern 
than long-term planning in the hotel industry (Olsen, Murphy, & Teare, 1994; Teare, Costa, & 
Eccles, 1998; West & Olsen, 1989).  
 
Executives at all three firms maintained that their primary responsibility, and one which 
occupied the majority of their time, was to focus on their “day jobs” as opposed to creating 
‘big picture’ plans. At Alpha, the CEO ordered that the functional EVPs be responsible for 
their departmental strategies, which he preferred to title “tangible action plans,” rather than 
rely on a centralised Strategy Department (which he disbanded years earlier) or the adoption 
of conceptual planning techniques. Similarly, the CEO of Beta generally avoided involving 
department heads in any kind of strategic planning so as to keep them focused on the 
company’s more immediate problems. At Gamma, the practitioners’ sole responsibility was to 
take care of their functional departments, with the CEO being quoted as proclaiming “I say - 
you do.” Olsen et al. (2008) suggested that within the hotel industry the processes involved in 
formal strategic management are seen as distractions from tangible pursuits, and this is clearly 
evident at all three firms.  
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Previous research has found that strategy tools are often used at strategy workshops 
(Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Schwarz, 2009). However, within the three firms cross-functional 
meetings were either largely episodes where the leader communicated strategies (Beta), 
tended not to involve “Strategy” developments (Alpha), or were eschewed in favour of 
informal and impromptu conversations (Gamma): 
 
“I think, as a company, we might be slightly unique in that we do have these 
informal discussions and [name of CEO] very often will get the management 
team together like that so we can just chat . . .  That’s about it as far as how 
formal our strategy process is, if we have one at all.” [Respondent in Gamma] 
 
The lack of strategy workshops, and correspondingly limited strategy tool use, can also be 
explained by industry practitioners’ general views that formal strategy exercises such as 
environmental scanning, which are a typical component of such episodes, are a waste of time 
(Olsen, Tse, & West, 1992). The industry is characterised, due to its roots in 
entrepreneurialism, as one where action and active problem-solving are valued and where 
‘soft activities’ such as scanning are seen as distractions from the achievement of tangible 
objectives (Olsen et al., 1992). Thus, formal meetings and workshops, as examples of ‘soft’ 
activities, are rejected, thereby limiting opportunities for tool use.  
 
According to Whittington et al. (2006), the pace of strategy formulation often prevents the 
analytical detachment required for practitioners to engage in the prescribed use of many tools. 
This is seen to be the case by practitioners, particularly at Beta and Gamma, where a formal 
strategy process was considered an obstacle to the fast decision-making required to remain 
competitive and proactive. This was important at both firms since they believed that their 
uniqueness comes from anticipating and creating customer preferences and market 
opportunities rather than imitating competitors. This perspective contradicts Stenfors et al.’s 
(2004) finding that many of their respondents thought that using tools hastened the strategy 
process through faster analysis and planning. It is, however, consistent with the views of their 
other respondents who noted that there was little time to use tools efficiently and that the use 
of tools occupied time that could instead be spent on solving actual business problems. 
Furthermore, the hotel company executives’ focus on short-term objectives and solutions was 
evidence that these hotel firms were committed to tangible, short-term goals, meaning that the 
time necessary to properly use tools for analytical and decision-making purposes would 
contradict such goals. Thus, contrary to Langley’s (1990) finding that formal analysis is often 
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used to procrastinate strategic decision-making, this study found that tools were often rejected 
for this very reason. 
 
Mintzberg (1994) notes that while analytical planning is about thinking in terms of boxes and 
what fits in them, the very nature of creative thinking as part of strategy formulation means 
that one must move beyond such boxes. His argument is clearly evident in the study’s 
findings. Many of the practitioners, for example, saw diagram-based tools such as 2x2 
matrices as particularly dangerous since they had no desire for their intended strategies to fit 
pre-established models since this would reduce their ability to differentiate their strategies 
from their competitors who used such tools. Both Beta and Gamma’s CEOs believed that 
because most firms relied on the same tools, they ended up with the same strategies, brands 
and problems. They therefore saw the use of strategy tools as counterproductive to the 
creation of unique strategies and novel competitive methods. The findings, therefore, largely 
contradict Knott’s (2006) suggestion that the thinking associated with tool use can be 
expansive and creative and that the use of tools may be most appropriate when innovative and 
proactive solutions are required. Instead, the views of practitioners in this study support 
Mintzberg (1994) when he notes the systematic bias in formal planning techniques which 
involve ‘narrow rationality,’ leading one away from human expressions of creativity and 
intuition and towards incremental rather than quantum changes.  
 
4.2 Legitimisation 
Practitioners searching for personal or occupational legitimacy are often said to rely on tools 
and techniques deemed credible by their colleagues, organisational communities and superiors 
(Seidl, 2007), as these are recognised or perceived to be acceptable and/or appropriate means 
for evaluating strategic options and making strategic decisions (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 
2006). Within the three organisations, however, the opposite was true. The general consensus 
was that there is more respect for strategic decisions that are based on personal experience and 
insights than on those established through formal tools or processes. Instead of adding 
credibility to a strategist or strategic decision, the use of tools was perceived to diminish this 
since ‘gut feelings’ and  ‘instinct’ were often more valued than more formal and analytical 
methods. Thus, although social pressures to conform often drive organisations to adopt known 
and used management techniques (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the opposite was found to be 
true for formal strategy tools and techniques. The practitioners’ rejection of tools can thus be 
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seen as an institutionalised practice (Carter et al.,2008) since it is important to their firms’ 
value systems, is passed down by the CEOs, and is unlikely to change.  
 
The criticism of tools and formal analysis was found to be linked to practitioners’ past 
involvement with tools, which had often proved frustrating and ineffective. This is reflective 
of Rigby’s (2001) findings that many practitioners believe that tools often do not deliver what 
they promise. In all three firms the failure of certain past strategies were associated with the 
fact that those responsible for the strategy formulation had relied too heavily on tools to 
structure the process and deliver the results without being critical enough of the ensuing 
recommended strategies. At Beta, for example, the failed strategy was described as the result 
of employing an expensive consultancy firm which facilitated the experience and duly 
“signed off” on the strategic plan, but which had failed to consider longer term implications. 
Gamma’s CEO, meanwhile, blamed the company’s former owner’s use of strategy tools for 
having nearly destroyed his key brand since it used standard kinds of tools and criteria and 
thus “pigeonholed [it] into some model of how hotels should be and (should) compete.”  
According to Alpha’s SVP of Business Intelligence, academic and consultancy tools within 
the firm had: 
 
“A bad reputation from a lot of the 70’s and 80’s McKinsey kind of 
engagements that were all these, you know, big pie-in-the-sky stuff, and that 
didn’t ultimately resonate with operations.” 
 
While tools may help practitioners to understand what is happening in their firms and 
environments, they are rarely designed to produce a right answer or miraculous solution  
(Ambrosini & Jenkins, 2007). However, within both Alpha and Beta the tools, and those 
responsible for using them on the failed projects, were blamed for not having designed the 
right strategy. These unrealistic and exceedingly optimistic expectations of the usefulness of 
tools have thus served to create an almost hostile environment where strategy tools are held in 
contempt by the firm’s top management. This finding, and Mintzberg’s (1994) suggestion that 
the limitations of some tools has as much to do with the short-sightedness of the people using 
them as with the tools themselves, therefore extends Rigby’s (2001) survey result by 
demonstrating that the notion that tools are thought to have failed to meet promises may be a 
result of practitioners having too high expectations of them. These hopes are perhaps falsely 
raised by the tool’s proponents, including academics, consultants and fellow practitioners.   
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Within all three companies strategy tools were largely considered ‘too academic’ and ‘not 
practical,’ with the CEOs all saying that they wanted their management teams to avoid this 
approach in their strategy-related work:  
 
“They think it’s a bit academic. I mean, the focus at [Alpha] is on what do we 
do  …  There’s not much patience here for the theoretical and the academic, 
and I think that our people out in the marketplace, they just want to know what 
to do. . . . We’re striving to be less academic and very much more real world” 
[Alpha respondent]. 
 
Like some of Knott’s (2008) interviewees who explained that their organisations did not value 
‘textbook’ tools, executives in the three firms were reluctant to be seen relying on academic 
concepts since these were not respected by their CEOs and other superiors. “People here want 
to be seen as executors, and they don’t want to be seen as ‘templatisers’” (VP-Marketing, 
Alpha). At Beta there was the oft-repeated story about how the CEO had saved the company 
from failure and how he blamed consultants and their tools for its near downfall: 
 
“We are not using strategic/academic concepts or tools … when no strategic 
model is telling you how to come back from hell, how can you structure your 
vision and what management style can you adopt to make people believe in 
you and subsequently in the company?” 
 
Similarly, the fact that Alpha’s former Strategy Department had been eliminated for its 
perceived failures meant that for many interviewees the academic tools and techniques 
commonly used by this department were not something with which they wanted to be 
associated. As a result many people were ‘gun-shy’ about using, and being seen to use, such 
tools. Similar to Grant (2003) findings that some practitioners are sceptical of the jargon 
associated with tools, Alpha’s managers were told to remove any academic terminology from 
strategy presentations since this was perceived to obscure their own created ideas. Both Beta 
and Gamma’s CEOs also used many colourful euphemisms when describing the relevance of 
academic ideas, suggesting in essence that their work was not practical and served no valuable 
purpose. Thus, while the strategy literature tends to suggest that particular strategic practices 
are often considered as more legitimate when they have been created or endorsed by 
academics and consultants (Whittington, 2003), this study found the opposite to be true: 
strategy tools associated with academics and consultants were considered less legitimate by 
top management.  
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Even though the use of tools may be justified and supported as  a result of  the endorsement of 
respected consultancy firms and academics (Johnson et al., 2007), and from  previous 
research and anecdotal information demonstrating their utility (Seidl, 2007), within the three 
firms the general view was that none of this provides tools, or their users, with any credibility. 
Instead, the use of externally-created strategy tools was seen to be detracting from 
practitioners’ credibility as strategic thinkers. Using tools was interpreted by many 
respondents to mean that he/she was not knowledgeable or experienced enough to strategise 
without them. This includes not only well-established tools but also modern techniques and 
approaches that practitioners had heard of or read about, even though previous research 
suggests that utilising new tools may also enhance a strategist’s credibility since it represents 
a modern and progressive approach (Lozeau et al., 2002). 
 
4.3 Industry Structure  
Much of the SAP literature suggests that strategy practices may not be relevant for all 
industries and that industry differences may render certain tools more or less useful. Many 
strategy tools are also thought to be valuable only within the specific industrial or national 
contexts in and for which they were created (Furrer & Thomas, 2000; Narayanan & Fahey, 
2005; Porter, 1991). As such they may not be applicable for different levels of environmental 
uncertainty, national contexts or industry sectors (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Martinez, 
Priesmeyer, & Menger, 1999). Across the three firms practitioners often cited the industry’s 
specificities as reasons why they and their firms rejected strategy tools.  
 
The hotel industry structure is fragmented, capital intensive, and involves extensive quantities 
of real estate that are usually owned by investors rather than hotel companies (Olsen et al., 
2008). These characteristics aided some practitioners to rationalise their rejection of specific 
strategy tools and the use of tools in general. The adoption of an asset-light strategy had led 
Alpha and Beta to manage and franchise, but not own, the vast majority of their properties 
and meant that they were not free to make all strategic decisions they might consider 
important. Similarly, although there were many strategic initiatives that they wished to 
implement at the property level, they were not able to do so without the buy-in and financial 
commitment of hotel owners and investors: 
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“It’s about selling the idea, the concept, to third parties who need to come 
along with you in order to execute because (Alpha) on its own, cannot 
executive anything.” (SVP-Development)  
 
In other words, as Brookes and Roper (2012) have noted, the fee-based model had resulted in 
the hotel companies being largely dependent on the cooperation of stakeholders such as 
franchisees and property owners in order to implement strategic choices. While previous 
research has shown that franchising imposes restrictions on discretionary strategic decision-
making at the unit level (Roberts, 1997), the current findings suggest that this is also true for 
corporate entities in the hotel industry, and that this negates some of the benefits of formal 
studies involving strategic planning tools and techniques.  
 
Various examples of how this industry structure affected the use and perceived value of 
generic strategy tools were encountered during the research at both Alpha and Beta, whose 
hotel portfolios comprised a vast majority of hotels with third-party owners. At Alpha, for 
example, several executives pointed to this structure as one reason why they did not use the 
BCG matrix. A traditional use of portfolio-planning matrices would imply that the firm could 
examine its different brands against one another and objectively decide which ones it should 
invest in (“Rising stars”) or withhold funds to (“Dogs”). Unlike a consumer goods firm that 
could stop manufacturing, selling or marketing a particular product, 
 
“. . . because we work with owner partners, we have a fiduciary responsibility 
to our owners to help them maximise their return on their assets that we 
manage, it just isn’t viable for us to be thinking about a certain brand as being 
a brand that we’re cashing out on . . . if we owned (all of) them, I think we 
would have more freedom to look at it differently” (SVP-Marketing, Alpha). 
 
The practitioners also suggested that while the use of this type of tool could point to 
investment being needed in order to strengthen the likelihood of a brand becoming a ‘Star’, 
this investment would generally need to be made at the property level by individual hotel 
owners. From the experience of the hotel firms the tool did little to demonstrate to owners that 
their capital investments would lead to direct financial improvements for their individual 
businesses which is  a key imperative since owners often put the interests of their own 
properties ahead of the brand (Bender, Partlow, & Roth, 2008). In other words, the standard 
strategy tools did little to help the companies convince franchisees to implement strategic 
changes and investments, and as such they were not often used for communication purposes 
with owners and managers. However, because many investments are necessary for the brand 
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but not necessary for a third-party owner, Alpha and Beta were required to convey to their 
stakeholders the strategic reasons as to why the latter needed to contribute to the brand’s 
success. With hotels owned by large investment funds and financially astute organisations, 
Alpha and Beta relied almost exclusively on financial tools and quantitative data analyses to 
converse with owners about the capital investment requirements necessary to ensure the 
success of respective brands. Observations that owners’ influence and involvement in 
decision-making has grown over the years (Gannon, Roper, & Doherty, 2010) was thus found 
to also extend, albeit perhaps without their knowledge, into reasons why hotel companies 
refrain from using certain tools. That is, even internal decision-making processes and 
practices were affected by the firms’ strategic content decisions such as its 
ownership/management structure. 
 
Fragmentation was another industry characteristic found to reduce the perceived value and 
practical application of tools such as positioning charts, SWOT analyses and Porter’s Five 
Forces framework. The firms needed to simultaneously compete against other multi-unit 
companies globally, whilst at the same time competing against a unique set of local rivals.  
Informants at the two largest firms pointed out that while their past efforts to use a 
positioning-chart analysis sometimes suggested that on a global scale a certain brand was 
becoming uncompetitive versus that of a competitor, the value of using the tool had become 
rather limited since the underlying analysis or tool’s communication power could not be used 
to justify that this was the case for an individual hotel unit belonging to a particular owner. 
Harrington (2005) similarly notes that geographic distribution impacts strategic decision-
making. Thus, while certain capital investments or other changes were deemed necessary in 
order to reposition specific brands, such actions were clearly not necessary for all hotel 
owners since not every property was underperforming its competitors. Such situations 
confirm that the ‘bricks and brains’ (Gannon et al., 2010) separation not only results in 
challenges to achieving integrated global strategies for hotel firms (Whitla, Walters, & 
Davies, 2007), but also impacts upon the pragmatic validity of some strategy tools. 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that organisations often replicate the practices of 
successful competitors, and this implies that specific strategy practices and techniques may 
develop as industry standards (Spender, 1989). This study found, however, that hotel firms 
purposely did not emulate competitors’ formal strategizing practices, contradicting Gunn & 
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Williams’ (2008) survey results which suggested that senior managers rely on those tools 
most popular in their industry. At Alpha, for example, a common perception was that 
competitors were outdated in their strategy work due to reliance on well-established 
techniques that did not accurately capture the nuances needed to successfully devise new 
strategies. For them, the strategists within the industry were seen as complacent and 
accustomed to repeatedly using the same tools and techniques as had been used several 
decades ago to analyse competitive situations and brands. They believed that these 
approaches, arguably institutionalised within the industry, did not provide users with a 
sustainable competitive advantage. Their views suggest that managers recognised the inertia 
and competency trap characterising large hotel chains which often deploy a consistent set of 
routines (Ingram & Baum, 1997). Alpha’s practitioners went on to comment that this reliance 
on established but ineffective tools may be a result of the fact that new tools which better 
reflect the industry’s contemporary challenges and competitive dynamics have yet to be 
created and disseminated. Thus it is not just academics (e.g., Becker & Olsen, 1995; Okumus 
& Wong, 2005) but also practitioners who note that management techniques for the hotel 
industry have not been created to parallel the changing needs of the industry’s managers, and 
this lack of development contributes, in part, to the rejection of tools as a whole rather than 
just to any one specific tool. Thus, while firms may copy existing tools from their competitors 
in order to minimise the benefits these afford them (O'Neill et al., 1998), this study found the 
opposite to be true since the practitioners opined that tools used by competitors provide a 
disservice rather than any competitive advantage as a result of being antiquated and 
inappropriate.  
 
A tool’s relevance is said to be limited to the firms or industries whose characteristics are in 
line with its assumptions (Porter, 1991). However, while the practitioners provided only a few 
concrete reasons for why they thought certain generic tools did not fit the industry or were 
particularly difficult to use, there was a consistent perception that the industry and firms were 
too unique to use standard tools, and unlike Haspeslagh (1982) who found that the BCG 
portfolio matrix was adapted to sectorial contexts, this was not evident in this study. These 
findings begin to help explain why some previous studies have found that service sector firms 
make little use of most strategy analysis tools (Aldehayyat & Anchor, 2008; Glaister & 
Falshaw, 1999). 
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5. Conclusions 
The study has contributed in a number of ways to our knowledge about the usefulness of 
strategy tools, learnt first-hand from practitioners. The findings about why and how strategy 
tools are not used responds to calls within the practice literature for empirical evidence about 
why the use of certain strategy practices are resisted and absent (Johnson et al., 2007) as well 
as for studies that reveal what is not practiced and why it is not (Carter et al., 2008). It 
similarly builds on the limited previous research which has explored reasons why 
practitioners do not find tools useful (Wright et al., 2013) and how context helps shape 
strategy practices (Jarratt & Stiles, 2010; Whittington, 2006). We discuss our key findings, 
and their contributions to researchers, educators and practitioners, below. 
 
5.1 Key findings 
Firstly, the findings elaborate on the literature suggesting that strategy tools may restrict the 
deployment of experience-based knowledge (e.g., Grant, 2003). This is contrary to the extant 
SAP literature which suggests that top managers are more likely to use strategy tools because 
they have greater strategic responsibilities and higher degrees of strategy-making experience 
(Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2007). Instead, our findings advocate that top 
executives often reject strategy tools because using them restricts their ability to draw on their 
own knowledge and strategizing experience. The view was that frameworks narrowed 
strategic thinking (Worren et al., 2002), inhibiting innovative ideas and action. Furthermore, 
our findings suggest that these executives reject the use of tools for the very reasons 
academics and consultants recommend them. These include their perceived lack of 
legitimacy, the need for creative and fast decisions, and the unwillingness to structure 
strategic thinking. Since top executives were found not to use tools, the study’s findings 
suggest that Knott’s (2008) view that the reported use of tools by top managers through list-
based surveys may only be ‘fashionable talk’ is credible and warrants further investigation. 
 
Secondly, the study contributes to the nascent work on the strategizing practices and roles of 
middle managers. Rather than the practitioners being labelled as strategists due to their use of 
tools (Mantere & Vaara, 2008) many of the case study firms’ middle managers interpreted 
being a competent strategist to mean the rejection of strategy tools. Their rejection of tool use 
was in large part due to the influence of their superiors, and thus the findings elaborate on 
Hodgkinson and Wright (2002) suggestion that the support of top managers is necessary to 
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legitimise certain strategy practices. In this sense, the view of senior executives that strategy 
tools had serious shortcomings and an inability to aid in decision-making permeated 
throughout the case firms. The practitioners’ rejection of tools can thus be seen as an 
institutionalised practice (Carson et al., 2000; Carter et al., 2008) since it is important to their 
firms’ value systems, is passed down by the CEOs, and is unlikely to change.  
 
Thirdly, the study found that there were few instances of strategy meetings and workshops, 
thus inhibiting the potential for strategy tool use (Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Schwarz, 2009). If 
more strategizing activities had taken place within the firms, the social and communicative 
benefits of strategy tools might have counteracted past frustration with the prescribed 
analytical functions of strategy tools. The domineering (albeit respected) leadership style of 
the senior executives – requiring all organisational members to support their own views about 
strategy tools and their approach to strategy making - was certainly one of the reasons why 
there was reluctance to perceive the positive use of tools as boundary-spanning objects  
(Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009), enabling effective collaboration amongst strategists at different 
organisational levels (Osterlund & Carlile, 2005). There thus appeared little space for 
“multiple viewpoints, translations and incomplete battles” (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p.413) in 
the process of strategy making, as it was all about ‘I say – you do’ as an approach to strategy.  
 
Fourthly, the findings also begin to answer the question of whether generic strategy tools 
created in and for the manufacturing sector are and/or can be used in the hotel industry by 
illustrating that some strategy tools are rejected due to specific industry contextual 
characteristics. In particular, the industry context influenced the use and perceived value of 
tools due to its unique ownership-management structure and the institutionalised practices 
where value is placed on practical work, short-termism and quantitative data. This, in part, 
rendered the use of selective strategy tools as inappropriate, affirming previous concerns 
about the validity of certain strategy tools across industries (Hodgkinson et al., 2006; Johnson 
et al., 2007; Okumus & Wong, 2005). Okumus & Wong (2005) suggested that industry 
contexts are important variables affecting strategy tools and their use, and this study found 
that industry context renders certain tools more or less useful and that not all tools are 
meaningful for all people or contexts.  
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The study also contributes to the strategic planning research in hotel management and tourism 
as it provides a new insight into the role and identity of actors involved in strategy making 
and offers further evidence that the context of strategic management is important. Taking a 
practice approach and exploring qualitative data about the actions and views of managers in 
situ, we would argue that the paper has provided some escape from the confines of 
restrictive/over-institutionalised “old sense” interpretations of the strategy world (Phillips & 
Moutinho, 2014). 
 
5.2 Recommendations for Researchers and Educators 
For strategic management researchers in tourism and hospitality it is suggested that more 
efforts go into building theory on practice rather than practice on theory. This study’s findings 
demonstrate that the practical reality of strategy making very often contradicts prescriptive 
advice, and through further in-depth studies where researchers work in close proximity to 
practitioners, they will continue to better reflect the reality. Based on the findings suggesting 
that practitioners perceive strategy tools as being solely for analytical purposes and as part of 
a rational decision-making process, and in line with the SAP focus on practice, educators are 
advised to facilitate their students’ learning about the social and ‘divergent’ approaches with 
which strategy tools can be used. These include their value as boundary spanning artefacts 
and ‘processual toys’, which groups of strategists can use together interactively to improve 
strategy work processes and communication.  
 
Tourism and hotel management educators are also advised to ensure that their students are 
aware of the fact that strategy is not necessarily practiced in the business context as prescribed 
by textbooks. Unrealistic expectations could otherwise cause students to underestimate the 
value of their education and learning if they associate organisational or industry norms as 
reasons to believe that the concepts and tools they learned are unimportant rather than as 
valuable ways for them to develop their analytical and synthesising capabilities. Involving 
more practitioners in the classroom is also recommended as a way to ensure that students 
learn not only the theory but the way things ‘really work’ before graduating so that they can 
better adapt themselves and their knowledge set to their firms’ expectations and requirements. 
This would also assist educators themselves with being able to link the theory to real world 
applications in their courses and, controversially, to step away from holding conventional 
strategy tools in an unmerited position of importance in strategic planning teaching.  
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Phillips and Moutinho (2014) suggest that after four decades of strategic planning research in 
a hotel management and tourism context, there remains limited attention on the various 
characteristics of practice and subsequently criticise this applied area for not keeping pace 
with mainstream literature on strategy. Whilst we may have been the first to specifically 
explore SAP in hotel firms, the very much wider industrial context of tourism appears to still 
display some paucity in strategy research taking a practice perspective and we would 
encourage more researchers to investigate the strategizing practices of practitioners in tourism 
organizations.   
 
5.3 Managerial Implications 
Wright et al. (2013) conclude that managers need peripheral vision; they need to constantly 
think in dualities and to look at issues from different angles. They have to also differentiate 
and then integrate complex bundles of issues. Strategy tools are, they say, therefore useful at 
helping practitioners to perform better analysis and arrive at superior decisions. Therefore, 
although not a panacea for favourable performance, practitioners should be more willing and 
able to employ relevant strategy tools. Managers are also recommended to reconsider the 
various possible roles and benefits of strategy tools beyond their “technologies of rationality” 
functions. The practitioners in this study tend to perceive tools as only analytical devices 
while not aware of the other applications such as their ability to facilitate debate and 
discussions and as boundary spanning objects across hierarchies and departmental divisions. 
These latter benefits may help mitigate some of the communication, coordination and 
relational challenges that result from the effects of hierarchal decentralisation which 
characterise the asset-light nature of hotel companies. 
One caveat to mention here is that some of the top executives investigated in this study had 
not acquired knowledge of strategy making via formal management education routes and had 
not been privy to the use of theoretical resources, which undoubtedly biased their views on 
strategy tools. If one was to replicate our research in the future it is likely that executives 
would be more professionally-educated given the focus is currently much more on the 
‘business’ of hotels. For now, it is important that practitioners recognise that recent hotel and 
tourism management graduates are eager to put their education to use in explicit ways that 
demonstrate their learning and the value of their education. One such way is to be able to 
employ strategy tools. 
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